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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment, commonly associated with the workplace or
classroom, also frequently occurs in the home. Unlike in employment or
academic settings, sexual harassment in housing is a relatively undevel-
oped area of jurisprudence. Only recently have the courts confronted a
steadily increasing demand to address matters of sexual harassment in
housing. Notably, every court that has been faced with the question of
whether sexual harassment is actionable under Title VIII has answered
affirmatively.'
Following this trend, in DiCenso v. Cisneros,2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that hostile environment
sexual harassment claims are actionable under the Fair Housing Act.'
The court further held, however, under the de novo standard of review,
that this particular tenant's claim "was not sufficiently egregious."4 The
court relied on Title VII legal theories, as is common in Title VIII cases.
1. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that housing
sexual harassment violates the Fair Housing Act); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that sexual harassment hostile environment claims are actionable under the Fair
Housing Act "when the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the
premises"). See also Williams v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Md.
1996) (noting "it is not difficult to conclude that this court should recognize sexual harassment as
actionable under Title VIII"); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(proclaiming "it is beyond question that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination"); Grieger
v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
2. 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1009.
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That is, the court treated this housing sexual harassment case as the
equivalent of an employment sexual harassment case.
This comment reflects upon housing sexual harassment jurispru-
dence and ultimately questions the common practice of applying Title
VII law to Title VIII cases. Part II sets forth the development of housing
sexual harassment case law. Part III introduces the recent DiCenso deci-
sion, and Parts IV, V, and VI focus on the application of the "sanctity of
the home" doctrine in the context of housing sexual harassment claims.5
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON HOUSING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Title VIII, also known as the Fair Housing Act,6 governs housing
discrimination. Specifically, Title VIII makes it illegal to "discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin."7 It is within this provision of the Fair Housing Act that
courts have found a cause of action for sexual harassment.8
Instances of sexual harassment fall into two major categories: "quid
pro quo" and "hostile environment."9 The most blatant form of sexual
harassment is quid pro quo, which involves tangible sexual demands
from a superior and consequences for failing to meet those demands.' 0
For example, an individual may be promised benefits such as promo-
tions, raises, or in the housing context, rent reduction or forgiveness, in
exchange for sexual favors. Quid pro quo. forms of sexual harassment
5. Shortly before the publication of this article, Michelle Adams, an assistant professor at
Seton Hall University School of Law, published an insightful article addressing similar concerns.
See Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 17. 18 (1998) (arguing for the development of "a more sophisticated and nuanced
understanding of sexual harassment at home by examining the context in which the harassment
occurred"). Professor Adams elaborates on the cultural and sociological factors that play a role in
sexual harassment in the home, addresses the disparity between damage awards in employment
and housing cases, and ultimately argues for recognizing the unique context of the home in
housing sexual harassment analysis.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
7. Id. § 3604(b).
8. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, I F.3d 1085
(10th Cir. 1993); Shellhammer v. Lewallen, Equal Opportunity in Housing Rep. (P-H) P15, 472
(W.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd without opinion, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Shellhammer v.
Lewallen, No. 84-3573, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 14205, at *1 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985).
9. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986) (recognizing that both
"harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors
[quid pro quo] and harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or
offensive working environment" violate Title VII).
10. See ANJA ANGELICA CHAN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF TITLE VII AND THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIM 6 (1994).
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are not as frequent or as debatable as the hostile environment complaints
of sexual harassment. "In the quid pro quo, the coercion behind the
advances is clarified by the reprisals that follow a refusal to comply.
Less clear, and undoubtedly more pervasive, is the situation in which
sexual harassment simply makes the work environment unbearable.""
Hostile environment sexual harassment may include both verbal, non-
verbal, and physical forms of harassment. 2 Examples of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment range from off-color jokes, 13 sexual
comments, and love letters to "innocent" touching (pats, pinches, and
hugs), sexual assault, and rape.
To establish a sexual harassment claim under the hostile environ-
ment theory, the victim must allege facts sufficient to prove four general
criteria:
(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was subjected to unwel-
come sexual harassment, (3) the harassment she complains of was
based on sex, [and] (4) the harassment she complains of is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of
[housing] and create an abusive [housing] environment.1 4
Quid pro quo and hostile environment claims often overlap. For exam-
ple, what begins as hostile environment harassment may evolve into
quid pro quo harassment when the victim is fired or forced to leave as a
consequence of rebuffing her harasser's advances.
Shellhammer v. Lewallen"5 was one of the earliest federal cases to
recognize sexual harassment under the Fair Housing Act as a cause of
action. 6 In Shellhammer, the landlord propositioned the female tenant
by asking her to pose nude on one occasion 7 and to have sex with him
on another occasion. 8 The tenants, the victim and her husband, sued
under both the quid pro quo and hostile environment theories of discrim-
ination.19 Although the tenants prevailed on their quid pro quo claim,
they were unsuccessful on their hostile environment claim.2 0 The Sixth
11. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment: The Experience, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
KNow YOUR RIGHTS 18, 34 (Martin Eskenazi and David Gallen eds., 1992).
12. See 24 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992) (defining hostile environment sexual harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct").
13. See MacKinnon, supra note 11, at 47 ("Jokes are another form that the social control over
women takes.... Trivialization of sexual harassment has been a major means through which its
invisibility has been enforced. Humor, which may reflect unconscious hostility, has been a major
form of that trivialization.").
14. CHAN, supra note 10, at 7.
15. No. 84-3573, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 14205, at *1 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id. at *4.
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Circuit agreed with the federal magistrate's opinion regarding the hostile
environment claim:
[l]t is clear that she has failed to satisfy the elements of this [hostile
environment] claim.... She points to two requests during the three
or four months of her tenancy. This does not amount to the pervasive
conduct which is a predicate to finding that the sexual harassment
created a burdensome situation which caused the tenancy to be signif-
icantly less desirable than it would have been had the harassment not
occurred. 21
Despite the fact that Shellhammer was decided more than a decade
ago, reports of sexual harassment in the housing environment are still
very infrequent. For example, in the state of Florida, only four sexual
harassment claims were filed with the Fair Housing Enforcement Center
since January 1, 1988.22 "Victimized tenants rarely report instances of
harassment by landlords or building managers, resulting in few rental
housing sexual harassment lawsuits. 23
A variety of reasons account for the paucity of sexual harassment
reports in housing. "The factors that deter women from reporting sexual
harassment are fear of retaliation, silence as the chosen form of coping,
aversion to the stigma attached to victims of sexual harassment, antici-
pation of ridicule, and a desire not to prolong suffering. ' 24 Also, as one
author notes, "there is a long history in this country of ignoring or down-
playing injuries experienced by a woman on the notion that 'she asked
for it."' 25 The consequences-real or imaginary-of reporting sexual
harassment keep many victims quiet. Victims prefer to disregard the
harassing behavior, rather than risk losing their homes.
In light of the infrequency of reporting, the lack of case law on
sexual harassment in housing is unsurprising. To date, only a few fed-
eral circuits have considered the issue of sexual harassment in the hous-
ing environment.2 6 In contrast to the small body of Title VIII sexual
harassment law, there is a well-developed body of Title VII sexual har-
21. Id.
22. See Letter from Linda H. Allen, Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, to the author (Nov. 24, 1997) (on file with author).
23. William Litt et al., Recent Development: Sexual Harassment Hits Home, 2 U.C.L.A.
WOMEN'S L.J. 227, 230 (1992).
24. Regina Cahan, Home Is No Haven: An Analysis Of Sexual Harassment In Housing, 1987
Wis. L. RaV. 1061, 1067 (1987) (setting forth common reasons for women's failure to report
sexual harassment).
25. CHAN, supra note 10, at 29.
26. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085
(10th Cir. 1993); Shellhammer v. Lewallen, Equal Opportunity in Housing Rep. (P-H) P15, 472
(W.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd without opinion, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985).
1134 [Vol. 52:1131
DICENSO v. CISNEROS: AN ARGUMENT
assment law.27 As a result, the courts are tempted to apply readily avail-
able Title VII doctrines to Title VIII claims.
One reason courts are willing to apply Title VII analysis to Title
VIII cases may be that, on the surface, many similarities apparently link
the two acts. The statutes use nearly identical language: For example,
they both prohibit discrimination "because of sex," and they were both
"enacted to ensure the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of impermissible characteristics."28 As one court put it, "the pur-
poses underlying Titles VII and VIII are sufficiently similar so as to
support discrimination claims based on sexual harassment regardless of
context. Indeed, it is the behavior that the law seeks to eradicate."2 9
In United States v. Starrett City Associates,3 ° the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the parallels
between Title VIII and Title VII. The court determined that "the
Supreme Court's analysis ... under provisions of federal law with goals
similar to those of Title VIII provides a framework for examining" dis-
crimination claims under Title VIII.31 In Asbury v. Brougham,32 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit continued this trend
of analysis. There, the court held that Title VII burdens of proof, estab-
lished by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 apply to Title VIII dis-
crimination claims.34 Similarly, in Honce v. Vigil,3 5 the Tenth Circuit
recognized that although "[t]his circuit has not yet addressed the issue of
sexual discrimination in the context of fair housing under Title VIII....
we will look to employment discrimination cases for guidance."36
The Fourth Circuit has also determined that Title VII law is appli-
cable to Title VIII cases. In Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp.,37 the
court held that the "futile gesture" doctrine38 applies in housing discrim-
27. See Litt, supra note 23, at 229 (noting the "dearth of lawsuits premised on sexual
harassment in rental housing" compared to the abundance of workplace sexual harassment cases).
28. Cahan, supra note 24, at 1077.
29. Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
30. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
31. Id. at 1101. See also Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926
(2d Cir. 1988) (analogizing to Title VII and holding that disparate impact claims are actionable
under Title VIII).
32. 866 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1989).
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. 866 F.2d at 1279.
35. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
36. Id. at 1088.
37. 907 F.2d 1447 (4th Cir. 1990).
38. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-66 (1977)
(clarifying that "[w]hen a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely
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ination cases. 39 "Fair employment concepts are often imported into fair
housing law .... Although fair employment and fair housing statutes
create and protect distinct rights, their similarities have traditionally
facilitated the development of common or parallel methods of proof
when appropriate."4
Since courts faced with Title VIII discrimination claims are turning
to Title VII case law for guidance, it is important to understand the ana-
lytical parameters established by Title VII cases. The most relevant and
frequently cited Title VII sexual harassment cases are McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green,41 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,42 and Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.43 Courts faced with housing sexual harassment
claims generally turn to these three cases for direction.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' the Supreme Court set
forth the analytical framework for employment disparate treatment
cases.45 First, the plaintiff must establish her prima facie case.46 The
burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate basis for
the action taken.47 If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must
then prove an existing pretext. 48
In Meritor,49 the Supreme Court held that hostile environment sex-
ual harassment claims are actionable under Title VII.5° Relying on Hen-
son v. Dundee,5 the Court explained that "not all workplace conduct
that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or priv-
ilege' of employment. . . .For sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment."' 52 In Harris,53 the Supreme Court further
explained that hostile environment claims must be analyzed under a
because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination
as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an application").
39. See 907 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the defendant's argument that
"differences between typical housing and employment cases make an extension of the futile
gesture doctrine unworkable").
40. Id. at 1451.
41. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
42. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
43. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
44. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 802.
47. Id. at 802-03.
48. Id. at 804.
49. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
50. Id.
51. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
52. 477 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir.
1982)).
53. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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totality of circumstances test.54 These cases provide the point of depar-
ture for sexual harassment analysis.
Last term, the Supreme Court decided three landmark employment
sexual harassment cases which are also likely to impact housing sexual
harassment litigation. First, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc. ,5 the Court put an end to a heated debate by holding that same-sex
harassment is actionable.56 Based on Oncale, it is likely that courts will
find same-sex harassment actionable within the context of housing dis-
crimination. Next, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth57 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,58 the Court chipped away at the tradi-
tional distinctions between quid pro quo and hostile work environment
claims.
Traditionally, in sexual harassment cases, vicarious liability has
only applied to quid pro quo harassment claims. In Burlington Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Ellerth,59 the Court held that agency principles, rather than
the categorization of the claim as quid pro quo or hostile environment,
control the determination of whether an employer will be subject to
vicarious liability.6" Then, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,6 the
Court held that a public employer was vicariously liable for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment despite the fact that the employer had no
actual knowledge of the alleged misconduct.62 The Burlington Indus-
tries and Faragher cases are significant in the housing sexual harass-
ment context because, based on their rationales, even an off-site property
manager or owner, someone who generally has little involvement with
the daily operations of the housing unit, may be subject to liability for
quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment by his on-site manager.
III. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE DICENSO OPINION
The DiCenso63 case illustrates the problematic nature of a court's
blind application of Title VII standards in Title VIII cases. DiCenso
involved a hostile environment claim under Title VIII.64 Christina
Brown, the tenant, alleged that her landlord, DiCenso, showed up at her
54. Id.
55. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
56. Id.
57. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
58. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
59. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
60. Id. at 2265.
61. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
62. Id.
63. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996).
64. Id. at 1004-05.
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door, seeking to collect rent or, in lieu of rent, sexual favors.65 DiCenso,
while caressing Brown's arm, told her "she could take care of [the rent]
in other ways."66 Brown refused and slammed the door on DiCenso.67
DiCenso continued to shout obscenities at Brown through the closed
door.68
The administrative law judge dismissed Brown's complaint on the
grounds that "DiCenso's conduct did not rise to the level of severity
required to create a hostile housing environment."6 9 On administrative
review, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Secretary's designee reversed,7" finding DiCenso liable for creating a
hostile housing environment.7 1 Ultimately, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit disagreed with HUD's findings.72
The Seventh Circuit, unwilling to defer to HUD's holding,
reviewed the case de novo.73 The court reasoned that, according to
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,74 the
court is required to give deference to executive agency decisions only
"where the agency has a particular expertise in the conflicting policy
considerations that underlie a statute, or where the agency previously
has considered the matter at issue in a detailed and reasoned fashion. 75
The court further reasoned that, unlike the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), HUD has not enacted guidelines, and the
court is therefore not required to defer to HUD's findings.76
The Seventh Circuit began its substantive analysis by recognizing a
cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment in the housing
context.77 The court noted that "a determination of what constitutes a
hostile environment in the housing context requires the same analysis




69. Id. at 1007.
70. Review by the HUD secretary's designee is provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 3612(h)(1)
(1994). "The Secretary may review any finding, conclusion, or order issued [by the administrative
law judge] under subsection (g) of this section. Such review shall be completed not later than 30
days after the finding, conclusion, or order is so issued; otherwise the finding, conclusion, or order
becomes final."
71. See 96 F.3d at 1007.
72. Id. at 1009.
73. Id. at 1008. Under the de novo standard of review, the court treats the claim "as if it had
not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
74. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
75. 96 F.3d at 1007.
76. Id. But see DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (arguing for
limited review of HUD's holding).
77. 96 F.3d at 1008.
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courts have undertaken in the Title VII context."78 The court applied
typical Title VII analysis, and relying on Meritor7 9 and Harris,80 refused
to find the landlord liable:
In this context, the problem with Brown's complaint is that although
DiCenso may have harassed her, he did so only once. Moreover,
DiCenso's conduct, while clearly unwelcome, was much less offen-
sive than other incidents which have not, violated Title VII.
DiCenso's comment vaguely invited Brown to exchange sex for rent,
and while DiCenso caressed Brown's arm and back, he did not touch
an intimate body part, and did not threaten Brown with any physical
harm. There is no question that Brown found DiCenso's remarks to
be subjectively unpleasant, but this alone did not create an objec-
tively hostile environment."'
Judge Flaum's dissent illustrates the central problem with the
court's reasoning: "Although the majority may very well be correct in
stating that DiCenso's conduct would not be sufficient to give rise to a
claim for sexual harassment under our Title VII precedent, the majority
provides no basis for doubting the reasonableness of the Secretary's
interpretation of the FHA."82 Judge Flaum's dissent begs the question,
whether the analysis under the Fair Housing Act should be limited by
Title VII precedents.
IV. THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME
For many individuals, the home is arguably the most private
sphere. Our homes serve as the forum for our most intimate activities,
including reproduction, consumption, and socialization.
Even if it is conceded that the home in America has lost some of its
sanctity as a castle for its occupants, the normative ethic surrounding
the castle doctrine-the image of the home as the center of family
life, a retreat, a sanctuary, a repository of an inhabitant's dreams and
a manifestation of his or her sheer identity-is far too important and
deeply rooted in American political and jurisprudential thought to
easily dismiss the castle doctrine and all that it implies.83
78. 96 F.3d at 1007.
79. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See also supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
80. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
81. 96 F.3d at 1008-09.
82. Id. at 1010 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
83. Thomas Katheder, Criminal Law-Lovers And Other Strangers: Or, When Is A House A
Castle?-Privilege Of Non-Retreat In The Home Held Inapplicable To Legal Co-Occupants-
State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 482 (1983). Katheder
discusses the right to use deadly force in self-defense within one's home and argues that "[t]o
ignore the privilege to stand one's ground in the home ... is to say to the victim that, as far as
shelter from external violence is concerned, you have no home"). Id. at 484.
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The often heard cliches, "sanctity of the home" and "one's home is
one's castle," reflect and reinforce the unique importance given to the
concept of home in our society.
The sanctity of the home doctrine is well ingrained in our society
and jurisprudence. Accordingly, legislatures and courts commonly pro-
tect individual rights that are exercised within or related to the home to a
higher degree than other rights.
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court recognized the special fea-
tures of the home that merited heightened protection.84 In Boyd v.
United States,85 the Court held that the search and seizure of Boyd's
personal papers86 were unreasonable in light of a person's right to be
secure in his home and effects.87 The Court pronounced that the protec-
tions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security.... They apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life."88
In the years since Boyd, the Supreme Court has revisited the sanc-
tity of the home issue in a variety of contexts. In its Fourth Amend-
ment89 case law, the Court has consistently afforded a higher degree of
protection to individual rights exercised within the confines of the home.
In Payton v. New York,9  for example, the Court struck down a state
statute that allowed warrantless felony arrests in the home.91 The Court
noted the importance of the home within the context of the Fourth
Amendment: "The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy
in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of
84. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
85. Id.
86. Notably, Boyd involved a forfeiture action against Boyd's personal papers, a quasi-
criminal action, and the Court went on to apply analysis based on the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
87. 116 U.S. at 627.
88. Id. at 630. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1980) ("The common
law sources display a sensitivity to privacy interests that could not have been lost on the
Framers.... [T]he adage that a 'man's house is his castle,' made it abundantly clear that... 'the
freedom of one's house' was one of the most vital elements of English liberty.") (footnotes
omitted).
89. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
90. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
91. Id.
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an individual's home.... ,92 In contrast to the Court's review of war-
rantless arrests in the home, the Court has upheld warrantless arrests in
public forums. 93
Another Fourth Amendment case that exemplifies the Court's tradi-
tional protection of the sanctity of the home is Oliver v. United States.9 4
In Oliver, the Supreme Court addressed warrantless searches and distin-
guished between "open fields" 95 and "curtilage." 96 The Court's inquiry
centered on a person's "reasonable expectations of privacy." 97  The
Court reaffirmed its holding in Hester v. United States98 that warrantless
searches are permissible in open fields because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an open field.99 The curtilage of one's home,
however, receives a higher degree of protection: "[C]ourts have
extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have
defined the curtilage . ..by reference to the factors that determine
whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately
adjacent to the home will remain private." '
In Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority,101 the federal district court
granted injunctive relief to public housing tenants whose homes were
searched without warrants as part of a "sweep" of public housing build-
ings. 10 2 One author, particularly concerned with the sanctity of the
home, commented on the Pratt decision: "The home, be it a public
housing apartment or a modem home in an exclusive suburban neigh-
borhood, is the one place where people have the right to shut out the rest
of the world and be master of their own domain."'0 3
Court decisions interpreting the First Amendment1" also support
92. Id. at 589.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (holding that warrantless arrests
made in public do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as there is probable cause to believe
that the arrested person has committed a felony).
94. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
95. An open field is an "unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (6th ed. 1990).
96. Curtilage refers to "any land or building immediately adjacent to a dwelling, and usually
it is enclosed some way by a fence or shrubs." BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
97. 466 U.S. at 181.
98. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
99. See 466 U.S. at 181.
100. Id. at 180.
101. 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. I11. 1994).
102. Id. at 793.
103. Andrew Byers, The Special Government Needs Exception: Does It Allow for Warrantless
Searches of Public Housing?, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1469, 1491 (1995).
104. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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the proposition that one's home is a sacred place, within which the rights
of the individual are protected to a higher degree than in other settings.
In Stanley v. Georgia,15 the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia
obscenity statute prohibiting private possession of obscene material."0 6
The Court reasoned that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch."10
7
The "captive audience" 108 doctrine reflects the Court's willingness
to protect individuals in their homes from unwanted speech. In Frisby v.
Shultz, °9 the Supreme Court determined that residents are "figuratively,
and perhaps literally, trapped within the home ... ."110 Accordingly, the
Court restated that the government has a "substantial and justifiable
interest" in protecting unwilling listeners when they are in their
homes. 1 '
Similarly, the Court has been very protective of expression from
within one's home. For example, in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 1 2 the Court
struck down an ordinance prohibiting the display of signs on residential
property.'1 3 The Court reasoned that the government's interest in keep-
ing a neighborhood free from clutter is not compelling enough, vis-a-vis
the traditional sanctity of the home, to justify restricting such
expression. "'
Additional examples of judicial respect for the sanctity of the home
can be found within the area of civil forfeitures. In United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property,"5 the Court held that the Due Pro-
105. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 565.
108. A "captive audience" describes "[any group subject to a speaker or to a performance and
which is not free to depart without adverse consequences." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (6th
ed. 1990).
109. 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a ban on residential picketing).
110. Id. at 487.
111. Id. at 488. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("Preserving the sanctity
of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can ... escape from the tribulations of their
daily pursuits, is surely an important value .... The State's interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order. ... ); South Suburban
Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a statute prohibiting realtors from contacting a resident for the purpose of listing her
home for sale once the realtor has been notified of the resident's decision not to sell).
112. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 54. See also Stan M. Weber, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Home
Owner Wins in Battle to Limit City Government's Power to Ban Residential Signs: City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994)., 18 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 157 (1995).
115. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
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cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment' 16 prohibits the government from
seizing real property via civil forfeiture proceedings without affording
the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard.' 17 The Court reasoned
that "[a]t stake in this and many other forfeiture cases are the security
and privacy of the home and those who take shelter within it.""' 8
The sanctity of the home doctrine is also championed in reproduc-
tive rights cases. In Griswold v. Connecticut,"9 the Supreme Court
struck down a state statute prohibiting married couples from using con-
traceptives.120 In its reasoning, the Court recognized a "zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.' 121 The Court
was particularly concerned with the fact that enforcing such a law would
require entering the private home: "Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship."1 22
Notably, the state of Florida recognizes the sanctity of the home via
its homestead exemption. 123 The Florida Constitution provides:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any
court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon,
except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations
contracted... for house, field or other labor performed on the realty,
the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead.... 24
In accordance with this provision, the Florida Supreme Court has held
that homestead property may not be seized pursuant to state forfeiture
proceedings.125 Similarly, the Florida courts have abolished the doctrine
of caveat emptor126 in the sale of residential real estate, but not in com-
116. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "No person.., shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend V.
117. See 510 U.S. at 62.
118. Id. at 61.
119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 485.
122. Id. at 485-86.
123. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (amended 1984).
124. Id.
125. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992). See also Jonathan D. Colan, You
Can't Take That Away from Me: The Sanctity of the Homestead Property Right and Its Effect on
Civil Forfeiture of the Home, 49 U. MiAmi L. REv. 159 (1994) (advocating the limitation of state
and federal forfeiture actions). But cf United States v. 18755 North Bay Road, 13 F.3d 1493,
1498 (1994) (holding that the state homestead exemption is preempted in federal forfeiture
proceedings).
126. Caveat emptor literally means "let the buyer beware" and refers to the general rule that
the buyer "must examine, judge, and test for himself." BLACK'S LAw DICtIONARY 222 (6th ed.
1990).
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mercial real estate transactions. 127 That is, only sellers of residential
property have a duty to disclose latent defects.128
Homestead exemptions are also found in other contexts. For exam-
ple, under federal bankruptcy statutes, a "debtor's aggregate interest...
in real property or personal property that the debtor or dependent of the
debtor uses as a residence.. ." is exempt. 129 Thus, creditors cannot seek
payment via sale of the debtor's home. The foregoing examples illus-
trate the historical significance of the sanctity of the home doctrine.
V. IGNORING THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME UNDER TITLE VIII
Despite the widespread acceptance of the sanctity of the home doc-
trine in a variety of contexts, the courts largely ignore the doctrine in the
context of Title VIII. This oversight is particularly ironic in view of the
fact that Congress enacted Title VIII "to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."'' 30 The most
logical setting for the application of the sanctity of the home doctrine
would seem to be in fair housing cases. However, when courts apply
Title VII legal standards to Title VIII cases, they effectively dismiss
sanctity of the home reasoning by treating discrimination in the private
sphere of the home as the equivalent of discrimination in the public
sphere of the workplace.
For a number of reasons, the courts should apply separate legal
analysis to these two types of discrimination. First, "[r]ental housing
sexual harassment is particularly invasive because it violates the sanctity
and safety of the home."'' 31 When the workday is over, an employee can
leave the office. Conversely, when a victim is harassed at home, there is
no readily available means to escape. Such entrapment is especially
inescapable for working class victims; working class women and their
children are most vulnerable.' 32 It is difficult for such victims to find
affordable housing on short notice. In addition, moving may require the
victim's children to change schools and may force the victim to lose
127. Compare Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (abolishing the doctrine of caveat
emptor in sales of residential property), with Green Acres, Inc. v. First Union Nat'l Bank of
Florida, 637 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (refusing to extend the seller's duty to disclose latent
defects to sales of commercial property). But cf Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1993) (abolishing the doctrine of caveat emptor in certain sales of commercial real estate).
128. See 480 So. 2d at 629.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1994).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
131. Litt, supra note 23, at 234.
132. Id. at 234-35 ("Low income tenants are more vulnerable to economic intimidation than
are their wealthier counterparts. They are also less likely to know their rights and how to negotiate
the legal system.").
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contact with a hard-to-duplicate support network, including persons with
whom to barter child care and other services.
Escape by slamming the door or ignoring the discrimination is
often not effective in the housing context. In most cases, the landlord-
harasser holds a master key to the victim's home. The victim will
almost invariably hesitate before admonishing the landlord, both out of
fear of eviction and in an effort to avoid escalation of tension. In virtu-
ally all such cases, the victim feels particularly powerless because she
feels alone and without a clear avenue for appealing her situation.
In strong contrast, most workplaces today have human resource
personnel to whom the victim can turn for assistance in dealing with a
harasser. The victim in the workplace can distance herself from the har-
asser more easily than in the housing scenario; she may be able to work
independent of the harasser, or with someone else as an intermediary.
However, in the case of housing harassment-a setting generally lacking
a disinterested intermediary-a victimized tenant is often expected to
direct her complaint to close associates of the harasser-the landlord or
housing manager-or even to the harasser himself.
Harassment within the home raises unique problems which are not
adequately addressed by Title VII case law. In particular, the ramifica-
tions of housing sexual harassment are often more frightening than
workplace harassment. Arguably, "the landlord who harasses a tenant
may create a stronger and more real sense of personal danger than the
employer who harasses an employee ... ."133 In addition, what consti-
tutes sexual harassment in the office may differ from what constitutes
sexual harassment in the home.
The same factual scenario may have very different implications
depending on whether the incident occurred in the home or in the office.
For example, imagine a scenario in which a supervisor approaches an
employee at the office and kisses the employee on the neck. This one
incident may not be "severe or pervasive" enough to constitute a hostile
environment within the employment context. On the other hand, imag-
ine the same scenario, but this time the harasser is the landlord who
comes to collect his rent and forces a kiss on one of his tenants. It seems
probable that the threat, fear, and intimidation may well be more severe
for the sexual harassment victim when the harassment occurs in her own
home. The contrast between these two very different settings illustrates
the need for separate legal analysis.
Contemporary Title VIII sexual harassment cases also illustrate the
need for independent standards of liability for harassment in the home.
133. Kathleen Butler, Note, Sexual Harassment in Rental Housing, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 175,
204 (1989).
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In general, Title VIII plaintiffs do not find relief under Title VII analy-
sis. For example, recall the Seventh Circuit's decision in DiCenso v.
Cisneros134 that the landlord's caressing of the tenant's arm and back,
while offering sexual intercourse in lieu of rent, was not sufficient to
violate Title VIII. 135
For similar reasons, the court in Shellhammer v. Lewallen failed to
find the landlord liable for hostile environment sexual harassment,
despite the fact that the landlord had propositioned the tenant to pose
nude136 and to have sex. 137  Further, in Honce v. Vigil,138 the court
refused to find the landlord liable under a hostile environment claim,
noting that "[h]ostile environment claims usually involve a long-lasting
pattern of highly offensive behavior."'' 39 Notably, the courts and HUD
disagree with respect to what constitutes sexual harassment in the
home.14° The results in these cases underline the inherent failure of
Title VII precedents to protect adequately the individual's right to free-
dom from harassment in the home.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII protects against instances of discrimination in the public
sphere of the workplace. Conversely, Title VIII protects against
instances of discrimination within the sanctity of one's home. While
both acts are generally aimed at eliminating discrimination, they apply
in very different contexts.
The sanctity of the home doctrine provides a legitimate, long-
honored basis for distinguishing between the work and home environ-
ments. However, the refusal of courts to recognize the distinction
between Title VII and Title VIII continues to deprive many victims of
their sanctuary.14' Title VIII cannot live up to its name, the Fair Hous-
134. 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. at 1008-09.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *1-*2.
138. 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
139. Id. at 1090.
140. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to defer to
the HUD Secretary's finding that the landlord had created a hostile environment and applying
straightforward Title VII analysis). See also Williams v. Poretsky, 955 F. Supp. 490, 496 (D. Md.
1996) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that HUD's interpretation of housing sexual harassment
under Title VIII should apply and, instead, applying Title VII employment sexual harassment
standards).
141. Throughout history, "the sanctity of the home" doctrine has acted as a double-edged
sword. For example, the doctrine has been used to keep the public, including police and courts,
out of the private home in instances of domestic violence. See Margaret C. Hobday, A
Constitutional Response to the Realities of Intimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic Homicide
Statute, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (1994) (recognizing that "society has largely ignored
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ing Act, until courts recognize the unique setting of the home and pro-
tect victims of housing sexual harassment accordingly.
CARLOTrA J. Roos
domestic abuse due to the traditional view that violence in the home constitutes a 'private
matter' "). But cf Linda C. McClain, The Sacred Body in Law and Literature: Inviolability and
Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 216 (1995)
(arguing that the image of home as "sanctuary for women and their families, a haven free from
violence. . . . [and] the imagery of inviolability familiar from privacy jurisprudence may serve
goals helpful to women").
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